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EXDIS

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS:TECH, MNUC, PARM, RO

SUBJECT: GLIGA VISIT: NUCLEAR COOPERATION

1. DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER GLIGA RAISED THE ROMANIAN REQUEST FOR ASSISTANCE IN NUCLEAR COLLABORATION IN HIS CONVERSATIONS WITH MR. INGERSOLL, MR. HARTMAN, AND MR. KRATZER. (HE DID NOT MENTION THE SUBJECT TO ACDA DIRECTOR IKLE.) TO EACH HE EMPHASIZED THE IMPORTANCE ROMANIA ATTACHES TO THE SUBJECT, AS DECISIONS PENDING IN THIS AREA WILL PROFOUNDLY AFFECT ROMANIAN ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT PLANNING IN THE YEARS TO COME. HE REQUESTED THE ASSISTANCE OF THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE IN OBTAINING ADVANCE ASSURANCES REGARDING EXPORT LICENSING FOR CERTAIN US-PRODUCED COMPONENTS OF THE CANDU REACTORS, THE PURCHASE OF WHICH IS NOW BEING NEGOTIATED WITH CANADA, AS WELL AS FOR ACCESS TO THEIR MANUFACTURING TECHNOLOGY.

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2. MOST DETAILED DISCUSSION OF NUCLEAR COOPERATION ENSUED FEBRUARY 10 IN A 90-MINUTE MEETING WITH OES ASSISTANT SECRETARY KRATZER. FOLLOWING ARE THE PRINCIPAL POINTS MADE BY EACH IN THAT EXCHANGE.

3. GLIGA READ AT SOME LENGTH FROM NOTES HE HAD BEEN GIVEN BY NCST PRESIDENT AND STATE NUCLEAR COMMITTEE

CHAIRMAN URSU. GLIGA SAID THE GOR UNDERSTANDS FROM THE RODEAN VISIT THE PROCEDURAL DIFFICULTIES PRESENTED THE US BY THE ROMANIAN REQUEST FOR ADVANCE ASSURANCES ON EXPORT LICENSING FOR THE US-PRODUCED COMPONENTS AND TECHNOLOGY IN THE CANDU PACKAGE. IN VIEW OF THE IMPORTANCE ATTACHED TO THIS SUBJECT BY THE GOR, HOWEVER, HE REQUESTED A REPLY TO ITS REQUEST FOR ASSURANCES AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.

4. REGARDING SAFEGUARDS, GLIGA SAID THAT IN THE CANDU NEGOTIATIONS NOW UNDERWAY THE CANADIANS ARE REQUESTING SAFEGUARDS WHICH GO "MUCH BEYOND" THOSE ENVISAGED UNDER THE NPT. THE CANADIANS ARE REQUIRING THESE SAFEGUARDS AS A PRECONDITION TO THE CANDU SALE. THESE ARE:
A) PRIOR WRITTEN CONSENT FROM CANADA IN EACH INSTANCE WHERE RE-EXPORT OF ANY EQUIPMENT OR NUCLEAR INSTALLATION MIGHT BE DESIRED BY THE GOR; B) PRIOR WRITTEN CONSENT FROM CANADA IN ANY CASE WHERE RE-PROCESSING OF FUELS MIGHT BE ENVISAGED; C) PRIOR WRITTEN CONSENT FROM CANADA FOR ANY RE-TRANSFER OF MATERIAL, EQUIPMENT OR TECHNOLOGY WHERE HEAVY WATER PRODUCTION IS INVOLVED.

5. GLIGA REITERATED THAT THESE REQUIREMENTS GO "FAR BEYOND" THE NPT OBLIGATIONS TO WHICH ROMANIA SUBSCRIBES. "THEY ARE OF SUCH NATURE AS GREATLY TO AFFECT OUR ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT PLANNING," HE STATED. ROMANIA IS AND WILL REMAIN FAITHFUL TO ITS OBLIGATIONS UNDER THE NPT, GLIGA ASSERTED. ROMANIA HAS NO INTENTION OF DEVELOPING NUCLEAR WEAPONS. OUR POSITION ON THIS, HE SAID, WAS CLEARLY STATED LAST YEAR AT THE NPT REVIEW CONFERENCE IN GENEVA. THE GOR DOES NOT AGREE THAT ADDITIONAL OBLIGATIONS SHOULD BE REQUIRED OF IT.

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6. TURNING TO THE "HOT CELL" QUESTION, GLIGA SAID THE ERDA REQUIREMENT FOR AN ADDITIONAL COMMITMENT RECENTLY BROUGHT BY CHESWORTH OF GENERAL ATOMIC TO BUCHAREST ALSO GOES "FAR BEYOND" THE GOR'S COMMITMENTS UNDER THE NPT, "AND OUR ANSWER WAS NO." GLIGA THEN REQUESTED STATE ASSISTANCE IN OBTAINING ERDA'S CONCURRENCE ON THE NEW FORMULATION WORKED OUT BY CHESWORTH

WHICH, GLIGA IMPLIED, IS ACCEPTABLE TO THE GOR.

7. GLIGA CONTINUED THAT ROMANIA REQUIRES NUCLEAR TECHNOLOGY FOR ITS OWN ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND, FOR THIS TO BE PRACTICAL, MUST ALSO BE IN A POSITION TO "MAKE ECONOMIC USE" OF IT IN THE FUTURE. WE NEED THE SUPPORT OF THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE, GLIGA REPEATED, STILL READING FROM HIS NOTES, TO ELIMINATE THIS "UNHELPFUL MANIFESTATION IN OUR RELATIONS."

8. MR. KRATZER RESPONDED THAT HE REGRETS THAT WE HAVE NOT YET BEEN ABLE TO GIVE THE REPLY THAT HAD BEEN ANTICIPATED DURING THIS MONTH TO THE GOR REQUEST FOR ADVANCE ASSURANCES IN CONNECTION WITH ACQUISITION OF CANDU COMPONENTS. HE ACKNOWLEDGED THAT THE GOR DESIRE FOR SUCH ASSURANCES IS "REASONABLE--WE UNDERSTAND YOUR NEEDS VERY WELL." WE DO NOT WISH TO DELAY THE ROMANIAN NUCLEAR PROGRAM IN ANY WAY, MR. KRATZER ASSERTED. WE, IN FACT, HOPE THE CANADIAN NEGOTIATIONS GO SMOOTHLY, AND WE ARE TRYING TO HELP WHERE WE CAN. WE HOPE TO HAVE AN AFFIRMATIVE ANSWER TO THE GOR REQUEST. HOWEVER, HE SAID, DESPITE THE DEPARTMENT'S CONSIDERABLE AND CONTINUING EFFORTS, IT WOULD NOT BE WISE TO PROMISE MR. GLIGA A PRECISE DATE FOR OUR DEFINITIVE REPLY.

9. MR. KRATZER POINTED OUT THERE ARE BOTH PROCEDURAL AND SUBSTANTIVE QUESTIONS RELATING TO THE GOR REQUEST. BOTH ARE RELATED TO AN INTENSE AND COMPLEX DEBATE NOW UNDERWAY IN THE UNITED STATES WHICH HAS A POTENTIAL TO IMPACT BOTH ON OUR OWN PLANNING FOR DOMESTIC NUCLEAR POWER DEVELOPMENT, AS WELL AS ON ALL ASPECTS OF INTERNATIONAL NUCLEAR COOPERATION. IN OUR SYSTEM, HE OBSERVED, A CERTAIN CONSENSUS IS REQUIRED FOR POLICY
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DECISIONS TO BE EFFECTIVE. MR. KRATZER ASSURED GLIGA THAT THIS INTERNAL US DEBATE HAS NOT MODIFIED OVERALL US POLICY: THIS ADMINISTRATION IS STILL COMMITTED TO THE DEVELOPMENT OF DOMESTIC NUCLEAR POWER; IT IS STILL USG POLICY TO ENCOURAGE INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION.

.10. TURNING TO SUBSTANTIVE MATTERS, MR. KRATZER RAISED THE SAFEGUARDS ISSUE AND SAID THE US IS PLEASED THAT ROMANIA IS A SIGNATORY OF THE NPT AND THAT THE GOR ATTACHES SO MUCH IMPORTANCE TO THE TREATY. THE US CONTINUES TO REGARD THE NPT (INCLUDING THE IAEA MACHINERY) AS THE "SINGLE MOST IMPORTANT ELEMENT IN INHIBITING NUCLEAR WEAPONS PROLIFERATION," MR. KRATZER ASSERTED.

11. HOWEVER, HE CONTINUED, IT IS ALSO ACCURATE TO STATE

THAT FROM THE OUTSET THE US HAS RECOGNIZED THAT THE NPT AND ASSOCIATED IAEA MACHINERY ALONE CANNOT BE THE ONLY, REPEAT ONLY, INSTRUMENT UPON WHICH WE RELY TO PREVENT NUCLEAR WEAPONS PROLIFERATION. MR. KRATZER STATED "WE HAVE NO INTENTION OF SEEKING CONTROLS ADDITIONAL TO THE NPT/IAEA SYSTEM BEYOND THOSE WHICH MIGHT BE NEEDED TO ENSURE THAT NPT OBJECTIVES ARE FULLY MET." IN THIS CONTEXT, MR. KRATZER CONTINUED, WE HAVE IDENTIFIED CERTAIN AREAS OF SUCH SENSITIVITY THAT THEY REQUIRE SPECIAL TREATMENT. THESE INCLUDE THE RE-PROCESSING OF

NUCLEAR FUELS. THE UNITED STATES BELIEVES RE-PROCESSING SHOULD BE CONDUCTED, IF AT ALL FEASIBLE, AT REGIONAL MULTINATIONAL CENTERS. SUCH CENTERS WOULD HELP TO PROVIDE CREDIBLE ASSURANCE TO THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY THAT NONPROLIFERATION OBJECTIVES ARE BEING MET IN THIS AREA WHERE THE POSSIBILITY FOR DIVERSION OF NUCLEAR-WEAPONS USEABLE MATERIAL IS RELATIVELY GREAT. HEAVY WATER PRODUCTION IS ANOTHER AREA REQUIRING SPECIAL TREATMENT, MR. KRATZER NOTED, AS IS THE ENRICHMENT OF NUCLEAR MATERIALS. THE SENSITIVITY IN THESE PARTICULAR AREAS OF THE FUEL CYCLE RELATES TO THE BASIC QUESTION OF NUCLEAR TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER EMBODIED IN THE GOR REQUEST.

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12. REGARDING ROMANIAN REQUIREMENTS, MR. KRATZER CONTINUED, WE UNDERSTAND THE CANADIANS CURRENTLY DO NOT REGARD RE-PROCESSING AS ECONOMICALLY ATTRACTIVE IN CONNECTION WITH THE CANDU SYSTEM, SO PRESUMABLY THIS QUESTION WILL NOT ARISE IN THAT CONTEXT. THE HOT CELL, HOWEVER, HAS A CAPABILITY TO BE MODIFIED AND UTILIZED IN RE-PROCESSING, AND THAT IS WHY WE MUST TREAT THE SALE OF THIS ITEM SOMEWHAT DIFFERENTLY. HEAVY WATER PRODUCTION ALSO MUST BE REGARDED AS SENSITIVE. MR. KRATZER SPECIFICALLY PROMISED TO INQUIRE ABOUT THE STATUS OF THE ERDA RESPONSE TO GENERAL ATOMIC'S NEW FORMULATION REGARDING THE HOT CELL AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.

13. AS FOR THE ADDITIONAL SAFEGUARDS GLIGA REPORTS THE CANADIANS TO BE SEEKING IN THE CANDU NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE GOR, MR. KRATZER SAID THESE ARE MATTERS WHICH THE CANADIAN GOVERNMENT DETERMINES FOR ITSELF.

14. SUMMING UP, MR. KRATZER STATED THAT WHILE WE ARE ENCOUNTERING DIFFICULTY IN PROVIDING A PROMPT RESPONSE TO THE ROMANIAN REQUEST FOR ADVANCE ASSURANCES, THE

REQUEST IS RECEIVING THE HIGHEST ATTENTION AND HE STILL BELIEVES THERE SHOULD BE NO DIFFICULTY IN COOPERATING WITH ROMANIA IN ALL AREAS ROMANIA SEEKS REGARDING FURNISHING OF NUCLEAR POWER REACTORS. THERE ARE RESTRAINTS IN SOME AREAS: RE-PROCESSING, ENRICHMENT, AND-HEAVY WATER PRODUCTION. MR. KRATZER CONCLUDED BY REFERRING TO OUR CONTINUING POLICY OF FAVORING INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION IN NUCLEAR ENERGY, WHICH TOGETHER WITH OUR FRIENDLY RELATIONS WITH ROMANIA AND BOTH NATIONS' ADHERENCE TO AND STRONG SUPPORT FOR THE NPT LEAD ME TO BELIEVE WE CAN WORK THESE PROBLEMS OUT."

15. GLIGA SAID THAT HE COULD NOT DISGUISE THAT HIS COLLEAGUES IN BUCHAREST WOULD BE DISAPPOINTED WITH HIS REPORT. MR. KRATZER RESPONDED THAT HE DID NOT INTEND TO CONVEY A PESSIMISTIC PICTURE, BUT IF THE GOR DID NOT FIND IT OPTIMISTIC, IT WAS CERTAINLY REALISTIC, AND NOT WITHOUT PROSPECT FOR FUTURE COLLABORATION BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES IN THIS

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IMPORTANT AREA. INGERSOLL

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